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The large and growing waves of immigrants entering the United States in
the past few decades have spurred an enormous amount of research assessing
the economic contribution made by these new Americans. Extensive research
has been conducted on many aspects of the labor market performance of
immigrants, including earnings, employment, labor force participation, arid
occupational attainnlent.1 These studies can be interpreted as an attempt to
measure the "benefits" provided by immigrant manpower to the U.S. economy.
Although some researchers have analyzed the impact of immigrants on native
earnings arid employment opportunities, much less effort has been devoted to
evaluating other "costs" that immigrants potentially impose upon natives.2
We examine a particularly striking and controversial example of these costs:
immigrant participation in the welfare system.
The conflict between immigration and the existence of a welfare state
raises questions of fundamental importance for social policy. There is a
widespread perception that unskilled immigrants are particularly prone to
enter the welfare system, and that the entry of large numbers of these
immigrants in the past two decades has increased taxpayer expenditures on
income transfer programs.3 There is also the fear that a relatively
generous welfare system increases the attractiveness of immigration to the
United States, particularly for those persons most likely to use the
available benefits. After all, the income opportunities available through
the U.S. welfare system are sometimes better than the typical income
opportunities available in many source countries. For instance, in 1980,2
per capita CNP in the Philippines was under $700, and in Mexico it was
approximately $1900, as compared to the average welfare receipts of about
4 $2700 for an immigrant welfare household in the United States.
Despite the critical importance of this issue for policy purposes,
little is currently known about immigrant participation in transfer
programs, and especially about how this participation has changed over time.
Two recent studies use cross-section microd.ata to compare how immigrant and
native families differ in their propensity to receive transfer payments.
Using the 1976 Survey of Income and Educa,ion, Blau (1984) finds that
immigrant families are less likely to participate in the welfare system than
demographically comparable native families, and her findings are replicated
in the 1980 Census data analyzed by Tienda and Jensen (l986). Among
families receiving public assistance, Blau also finds the level of welfare
receipts to be roughly the same in immigrant and native households. These
authors conclude that immigrants do not disproportionately burden the income
transfer system.
While suggestive of empirical regularities, these studies suffer from
the methodological problem that a single cross-section of data cannot
distinguish between aging and cohort effects.6 Hence the existing
literature provides no evidence as to whether recent immigrant cohorts are
more likely to receive welfare than earlier cohorts, or how welfare
participation behavior evolves over time as a given cohort assimilates in
the United States. These cohort and assimilation effects have proven to be
important factors influencing immigrant skills and earnings (orjas 1985),
so it is likely that they also play a significant role in determining
immigrant welfare participation.73
This paper presents a systematic empirical analysis of immigrant
participation in the welfare system using the 1970 and 1980 U.S. Censuses.
The availability of two cross-sections allows us to separately identify
cohort and assimilation effects, and this approach yields a more meaningful
description of the patterns of immigrant welfare recipiency than has been
provided by previous research.
Data and Descriptive Analysis
To provide a background for the study, we begin by presenting
descriptive statistics summarizing welfare use by immigrants. We use data
drawn from the 1970 2/100 U.S. Census (obtained by pooling the 5% SMSA and
County Group Sample and the 5% State Sample) and the 1980 5/100 A file of
the U.S. Census.8 The analysis is restricted to households not residing in
group quarters and headed by individuals who are at least 18 years of age.
The household is the unit of observation.9 We use the Census
definition of public assistance income, which includes cash receipts under
such programs as Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Supplemental
Security Income (which includes old-age assistance, aid to the blind, and
aid to the permanently and totally disabled), and general assistance. This
definition specifically excludes social security income, permanent
disability insurance payments, medicare payments, and unemployment insurance
benefits. A household is defined to be on welfare if anyone in the
household received public assistance income in the calendar year prior to
the Census.
The native or immigrant status of a household is determined according to4
the country of birth of the household head. For immigrant households, the
year of migration of the head is used to allocate the household to a
specific immigrant cohort. While not without potential problems, this
method of defining household immigrant status is straightforward and ensures
comparability with previous analyses of immigrant welfare participation.
Table 1 compares the welfare participation rates of immigrants and
natives, and also documents how welfare participation varies across
immigrant cohorts. Welfare participation rates are presented for all
households, as well as separately for mal_e-headed and female-headed
households. Overall, welfare participation rates increased between 1970 and
1980 for both immigrants and natives. However, the rate of increase was
much greater in the immigrant population. In 1970, the welfare
participation rate of immigrant households was slightly lower than that of
native households, while in 1980 welfare participation was almost a full
percentage point higher for immigrants than for natives.
This pattern of increasing welfare recipiency by immigrants occurs
among both male-headed and female-headed households. For instance, in 1970
male-headed immigrant households were only .8 percentage points more likely
to receive welfare than male-headed native households, while by 1980 the
differential in welfare use had jumped to 1.7 percentage points. Similarly,
the welfare participation rate of female-headed immigrant households was 4.4
percentage points below that of their native counterparts in 1970. but only
1.5 percentage points below in 1980. Evidently, immigrant welfare
dependency was on the rise during this decade, both in absolute terms and
relative to natives.
Table 1 also demonstrates that welfare participation withintheTABLE 1
Welfare Participation Rates of Native
and Immigrant Households
Percentage of Households Receiving Welfare
Year of Immigration
Census Year/ All Immi- Before
Crouy Natives grants1975-801970-741965-691960-641950-59_195Q
1970:
All Households 6.1 5.9 - - 5.5 6.5 5.0 6.2
(57,962) (88.140) (9,134)(7,697) (14.621) (56,688)
Male-Headed 3.7 4.5 - - 4.4 4.9 3.6 4.7
Households (45,692) (66,482) (7,770)(6,446) (12.284) (39,982)
Female-Headed 14.8 10.4 - - 11.7 14.5 12.4 9.7
Households (12,270) (21,658) (1,364) (1,251) (2,337) (16,706)
1980:
All Households 7.9 8.8 8.3 8.4 10.2 9.2 7.1 9.3
(72,024) (296,175) (41,212) (38,082) (35,161) (28,479) (49,035) (104206)
Male-Headed 4.8 6.5 6.9 5.8 7.1 6.3 4.8 7.3
Households (51,950) (212,698) (33,906) (30,626) (27,046) (21,561) (36,869) (62,690)
Female-Headed 16.2 14.7 14.6 19.1 20.5 18.4 14.1 12.3
Households (20,074)(83,477) (7,306) (7,456) (8,115) (6,918) (12,166) (41,516)
Note: The sample sizes are given in parentheses.S
immigrant population varies significantly across cohorts, with more recent
arrivals having higher welfare participation rates than earlier immigrant
cohorts at the same stage of the assimilation process. For instance, the
most recent immigrant households in the 1970 data, 1965-1969 arrivals,had
an overall welfare participation rate of only 5.5 percent. Inthe 1980
Census, however, the most recent immigrant households, those who came
between 1975 and 1980, had a welfare participation rate of 8.3 percent.
This 2.8 percentage point increase in the welfare participation rate across
immigrant cohorts exceeds the correspondl,pg increase of 1.8 percentage
points experienced by native households over the decade. Thereforethe
1975-1980 immigrant cohort uses the welfare system more intensively than the
1965-1969 cohort, after controlling for years since migration and the
secular rise in welfare recipiency among natives.
Other comparisons between earlier and more recent immigrant cohorts
yield the same conclusion. For example, in 1970 the welfare participation
rate of immigrants who arrived between 1950 and 1959, and hence have been in
the United States between 10 and 20 years, was 5.0 percent. In 1980,
however, the welfare participation rate of immigrants with 10-20 years of
residence in this country was between 9 and 10 percent, once again a much
larger increase in welfare recipiency than that experienced by natives.
Similar patterns also emerge from the data disaggregated by sex of the
household head.
These findings suggest that the increase in immigrant welfare
participation between 1970 and 1980 is partly due to the arrival of cohorts
with higher welfare propensities than the older cohorts they are replacing.
However, it is also the case that, for a given immigrant cohort, welfare6
participation increases with the amount of time the cohort has spent in the
United States. In order to document this assimilation effect, Table 2
tracks the welfare participation of corresponding age/cohort groups across
the 1970 and 1980 Censuses. This enables us to observe how the welfare
recipiency rate of a given group of immigrants changed over the decade)0
By comparing the change for immigrants with the corresponding change for
natives, it becomes clear that immigrant welfare participation increased
with age by a greater amount than did the welfare participation of natives.
For instance, natives aged 18-34 inL970 had a welfare participation
rate of 5.2 percent, whereas the rate was 6.5 percent for this same group of
natives in 1980, when they were between the ages of 28 and 44. This amounts
to an increase in welfare participation of 1.3 percentage points over the
decade for these natives. The analogous increase was 4.3 percentage points
for immigrants in the same age interval who arrived in this country between
1965 and 1969. Therefore the effect of aging on welfare participation was
much larger for this immigrant cohort than for a comparable group of
natives. By using different age groups or different immigrant cohorts,
various comparisons can be made from Table 2, and in general the same
conclusion emerges: welfare participation increases with age more rapidly
for immigrants than for natives. This pattern is less prevalent in the
middle-aged sample, whereas it is strongest for the oldest age group.
although sample attrition because of death may affect the results for this
latter group. The bottom two panels of Table 2 repeat these calculations
separately for male-headed and female-headed households, with similar
results.
To complete our descriptive analysis, Table 3 reveals sizable variationTABLE 2
TheImpact of Aging on Welfare Participation Rates
Percentase of Households Receiving Welfare
Age Group/ Year of Migration
Census Year Natives All Immiarants 1965-69 1960-64 1950-59 Before 1950
A. All Households
18-34 in 1970 5.2 3.9 3.2 4.3 4.8 3.5
28-44 in 1980 6.5 6.9 7.5 7.3 5.8 6.6
35-49 in 1970 4.5 4.5 5.8 5.4 4.1 3.8
45-59 in 1980 7.2 7.3 10.1 8.8 6.2 6.4
50+ in 1970 7.5 6.8 12.2 13.3 6.5 6.5
60+ in 1980 10.8 11.0 27.1 19.5 11.0 10.0
8. Male-Headed Households
18-34 in 1970 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.9 2.8 2.4
28-44 in 1980 3.3 4.2 4.8 4.6 3.3 3.5
35-49 in 1970 2.8 3.4 4.6 4.5 3.0 2.5
45-59 in 1980 4.8 5.6 8.2 6.8 4.5 4.6
50+ in 1970 5.3 5.4 10.8 10.7 5.2 5.0
60+ in 1980 7.9 9.1 21.7 14.7 8.4 8.3
C. Female-Headed Households
18-34 in 1970 203 11.5 8.1 12.2 16.0 9.7
28-44 in 1980 18.4 16.7 17.6 16.9 15.0 17.5
35-49 in 1970 15.9 11.1 13.1 11.0 11.0 10.3
45-59 in 1980 15.7 12.9 16.1 15.5 11.7 11.3
50+in1970 12.9 10.8 17.9 22.3 11.6 9.7
60+ in 1980 14.9 13.8 37.7 29.0 16.4 12.3TABLE 3
Immigrant Welfare Participation Rates in 1980, by Country of Origin
All Households Female-Headed HouseholdsMale-Headed Households
Country % on Welfare Sample Size % on Welfare Samole Size % on Welfare Sample Size
Eurooe:
Austria 6.9 4085 10.2 1766 4.4 2319
Czechoslovakia 5.7 3206 7.0 1137 5.0 2069
Denmark 4.0 1172 6.5 353 2.9 819
France 6.1 2551 9.0 1036 4.2 1515
Vest Germany 4.7 18821 7.6 6766 3.2 12055
Greece 6.3 5060 12.9 908 4.9 4152
Hungary 6.3 4316 9.3 1458 4.8 2858
Ireland 6.4 5069 9.9 2116 3.9 2953
Italy 7.3 22412 12.1 6004 5.6 16406
Netherlands 4.1 2720 7.8 642 3.0 2078
Norway 5.9 1829 8.6 579 4.6 1250
Poland 6.3 11880 9.1 4080 4.9 7800
Portugal 8.0 3474 21.1 508 5.7 2966
Romania 7.7 1778 11.5 480 6.3 1298
Spain 13.4 1592 19.8 334 11.8 1258
Sweden 5.5 2213 8.5 777 3.8 1436
Switzerland 3.9 1149 7.1 339 2.6 810
United Kingdom 5.4 15147 9.2 5641 3.2 9506
USSR 8.9 12589 11.6 4564 7.3 8025
Yugoslavia 6.1 3989 11.2 920 4.6 3069
Asia and Africa:
China 8.7 6453 15.0 994 7.5 5459
Egypt 6.0 1050 15.3 131 4.7 919
India 2.4 4307 6.5 294 2.1 4013
Iran 2.3 2557 6.8 336 1.7 2221
Israel 4.7 1473 9.6 219 3.8 1254
Japan 5.1 3806 9.0 1266 3.2 2540
Korea 6.1 3340 8.4 702 5.5 2638
Philippines 10.6 8099 12.2 1681 10.2 6418
Vietnam 29.3 2587 39.1 478 27.1 2109
Western Hemisphere:
Argentina 6.1 1416 13.2 265 4.5 1151
razi1 5.9 713 9.9 181 4.5 532
Canada 6.3 20094 11.1 6952 3.8 13142
Colombia 8.7 2630 15.8 673 6.3 1957
Cuba 18.0 12758 31.7 2882 14.0 9876
Domin. Rep. 25.8 3207 41.0 1473 12.8 1734
Ecuador 11.5 1551 30.2 364 5.8 1187
Guatemala 9.1 1088 17.7 317 5.6 771
Haiti 10.3 1726 17.5 584 6.7 1142
Jamaica 7.9 3845 12.1 1616 4.9 2229
Mexico 12.4 38774 29.3 7036 8.7 31738
Panama 11.5 1195 20.3 492 5.4 703
Trin.Tobago 9.1 1348 15.1 542 5.1 8067
in welfare participation across immigrants originating in different
countries. For instance, overall welfare participation rates range from as
low as 2.3 percent for households immigrating from Iran to over 25 percent
for Vietnamese and Dominican households. The dispersion is even more
striking among female-headed households. The welfare participation rate of
households whose female head was born in Denmark is 6.5 percent, while the
corresponding rate for female-headed households from Mexico is 29.3 percent,
and that for female-headed households originating in the Dominican Republic
is 41.0 percent. The data indicate that Jmmigrant households from the Latin
American and Asian countries that account for much of recent U.S.
immigration tend to have relatively high rates of welfare use.11 This
suggests that the pattern of increased welfare participation by recent
immigrant cohorts may be at least partly due to changes in the country of
origin composition of the immigrant flow, and this issue will be examined in
greater detail below.
Cross-Section Estimates
To facilitate comparisons with previous work and also to provide a
benchmark for the analysis that follows, we first present cross-section
estimates of the determinants of household welfare participation. Table 4
reports logit estimates of welfare participation probabilities using the
1980 Census.12 The independent variables in column 1 include age and sex of
the household head, age squared, and a vector of dummy variables indicating
immigrant status and year of arrival. In column 2 we add controls for the
education, marital status, health, and racial/ethnic background of theTABLE 4
Logit Estimatesof Welfare Participation Propensities:
1980 Cross-Section
(1) (2)
Variable Coefficient dP/dX Coefficient dP/dX
Age .0142*** .0011 .0362*** .0029
(4.19) (9.26)
Age Squared .00004 .000003 -.0004*** -.00003
(1.37) (-9.76)
Migrated 1975-80 .4167*** .0334 -.0484 -.0039
(10.68) (-1.05)
Migrated 1970-74 .3588*** .0288 -.2792*** -.0224
(9.09) (-6.06)
Migrated 1965-69 •4793*** •.0385 -.0252 -.0020
(12.78) (-.58)
Migrated 1960-64 .3152*** .0253 -.0486 -.0039
(7.64) (-1.04)
Migrated 1950-59 -.0500 -.0040 -. 1198*** -.0096
(-1.37) (-2.97)
Migrated Before 1950 -. 3655*** -.0293 -.4405*** -.0354
(-11.78) (-13.00)
Female-Headed Household .9687 .0777 .6505*** .0522
(47.04) (21.15)
Black - . 9167*** .0736
(24.70)
Hispanic - .8201*** .0658
(26.66)




-2 Log Likelihood 74462.8 65394.9
Sample Size 133,374 133,374
Note: The t-statistics are presented in parentheses. The marginal impacts dP/dX
are evaluated at the mean 1980 welfare participation probability in the immigrant
sample, which is .088. The additional standardizing variables used in column 2 are:
education, marital status, and health of the household head; the number of children
in the household aged 0-5, 6-11, and 12-17; the number of persons aged 65 or over;
the number of disabled persons; household size; and whether the household resides in
a metropolitan area.
*Statisticallysignificant at the .10 level; **atthe .05 level; ***atthe .01
level (two-tailed tests).8
household head, as well as variables identifying whether the household
resides in a metropolitan area, the number of children aged 0-5, 6-11, and
12-17 in the household, the number of persons aged 65 or more in the
household, the number of disabled persons in the household, and household
size. For the sake of brevity, we do not report the coefficients for most
of these control variables.
The results in Table 4 are similar to previous cross-section estimates
by Blau (1984) and Tienda and Jensen (1986). Households headed by white
females or minority males are roughly fro 5 to 7 percentage points more
likely to receive public assistance than are households headed by white
males, and welfare participation also increases with the age of the
household head. More directly relevant to the present study, most immigrant
cohorts display greater welfare participation than natives when only the age
and sex of the head are held constant, but once we control for other
household characteristics this pattern is reversed. Other than the tendency
for welfare use to be lowest for those immigrants who arrived before 1950,
immigrant welfare participation does not appear to vary systematically with
yearssince migration. Qualitatively similar results (not shown) were
obtained from logits estimated separately for male-headed and female-headed
households and from logits estimated on the 1970 Census cross-section.
Pooled Estimates
We now examine how immigrant welfare participation differs across
immigrant cohorts and evolves for a specific immigrant cohort as the cohort
assimilates in the United States. By tracking immigrant cohorts across9
successive censuses, it is possible to separately identify cohort and
assimilation effects (Borjas 1985, 1987). Pooling immigrant and native
households from both the 1970 and 1980 Censuses, we estimate the following
logit specification of P, the probability that household i receives public
assistance:
(1) log [P./(l-P.)) —X+a1y+a2y+ ++ Li
Thevector X includes the same control variables that were used in the
cross-section estimates. For immigrants, y represents the number of years
the head has resided in the United States, while for natives y is set equal
to zero. Because the household head's age is held constant in the vector X,
the coefficients a1 and a2 measure the effect of assimilation on immigrant
welfare participation. The vector of dummy variables C indicates the
calendar year of migration of the household head, and these dummies are set
equal to zero for natives. The coefficient vector ,therefore,represents
the cohort effects. Finally, the variable is set equal to one if the
observation is drawn from the 1980 Census, and zero otherwise, and its
coefficient ymeasuresthe period effect.
Equation (1) imposes the restriction that the period effect on welfare
participation rates experienced by immigrants is identical to the period
effect for natives. This restriction is necessary in order to separately
identify the assimilation and cohort effects.13 By appropriate definition
of the native-born sample to be included in the regressions, it iseasy to
allow for alternative specifications of the immigrant period effect. In
preliminary work, we tried a number of possibilities, and our results were10
not affected by this experimentation. Throughout the analysis, therefore,
the native base will be a random sample of all native U.S. households (which
was the same native base used in the cross-section estimates). For
simplicity and computational tractability, equation (1) also restricts the
impact of the demographic variables X to be the same for immigrants and
natives.
Table 5 reports estimates of equation (1) from the pooled data. Column
1 presents the simplest specification in which the control vector X includes
only the sex of the household head and a,,quadratic in the head's age. This
specification summarizes the aging, cohort, and period effects in the raw
data, and may be the most relevant for calculating the costs added to the
welfare system by immigration. Given that the family reunification emphasis
of current U.S. immigration law prevents authorities from selecting among
potential immigrants based on observable socioeconomic characteristics, what
matters for policy purposes is whether immigrants are more likely to receive
welfare than natives, and not whether they are more likely to receive
welfare than demograhica11v comparable natives. However, we also provide
estimates in column 2 that control for the full range of demographic
variables.
The coefficient of the dummy variable indic'ating if the observation is
drawn from the 1980 Census, which captures the period effect, is always
positive and significant. The typical household in the 1980 Census was 1-2
percentage points more likely to receive welfare payments than the typical
household in the 1970 Census. This result probably reflects the increased
availability of transfer payments in the 1970s (U.S. Bureau of the Census,
1980, p. 35L).Variable
Logit Estimates of Welfare Participation






































































































.008 8 1980 Census
Controls for Demographic
Variables Yes
-2 Log Likelihood 125307.4 110805.0
Sample Size 250,527 250,527
Note: The t-statistics are presented in parentheses. The marginal impacts dP/dX
are evaluated at the mean 1980 welfare participation probability in the immigrant
sample, which is .088. The additional standardizing variables used in column 2 are:
education, marital status, and health of the household head; the number of children
in the household aged 0-5, 6-11, and 12-17; the number of persons aged 65 or over;
the number of disabled persons; household size; and whether the household resides in
a metropolitan area.
*Statisticallysignificant at the .10 level; **atthe .05 level; ***atthe .01
level (two-tailed tests).11
The cohort variables in Table 5 document several important facts about
immigrant welfare participation. The coefficients of these variables
measure the differential in welfare participation rates between immigrants
and natives at the time of immigration (i.e., when the years since migration
variable equals zero), and also describe the pattern of welfare recipiency
across immigrant cohorts. Unlike the cross-section estimates, there is now
a clear pattern as to how immigrant welfare participation varies with time
of arrival. Regardless of which set of standardizing variables is used,
recent immigrant cohorts are more likely than earlier immigrant cohorts, at
any given tenure of U.S. residence, to be welfare recipients. This cohort
effect is sizable. In column 1, for example, the 1975-1980 cohort of
immigrants has a welfare participation rate that is 1 percentage point
higher than that of the 1965-1969 cohort, 2 percentage points higher than
that of the 1960-1964 cohort, and almost 6 percentage points higher than
that of the cohort which migrated in the l950s.
These cohort effects persist in column 2, which implies that they are
not solely due to demographic differences across immigrant waves. In column
2, the welfare participation rate of immigrants in the 1975-1980 cohort is 2
percentage points higher than that of the 1965-1969 cohort, about 3 points
higher than that of the 1960-1964 cohort, and 4 points higher than that of
the 1950-1959 cohort. It is noteworthy that the secular trends in welfare
use across immigrant cohorts mirror the cohort effects on labor market
earnings reported in Borjas (1985). Recent immigrant cohorts not only have
lower earnings than earlier cohorts, but they also have higher welfare
participation rates
14
Because the column 2 logits include a vector of variables indicating12
the household's racial/ethnic background (black, Hispanic, or Asian, with
whites as the omitted group), the coefficients on the immigrant cohort
variables measure within race differentials in welfare participation rates
between immigrant and native households. These standardized differentials
imply that immigrant households from every cohort are less likely to receive
welfare than demographically comparable native households. However, because
nonwhite households have such high welfare recipiency races, all cohorts of
nonwhite immigrant households are more likely to receive welfare than
otherwise similar white native households.. For example, consider Hispanic
immigrant households that arrived between 1965 and 1969. Although these
households have a welfare participation rate that is almost 3 percentage
points lower than that of Hispanic households native to the United States,
this is more than offset by the fact that in general Hispanic households are
8 percentage points more likely to receive public assistance than white
households, with the result that Hispanic immigrant households from the
1965-1969 cohort have welfare participation rates over 5 points higher than
otherwise similar white native households. Given that immigrants are
disproportionately nonwhite, controlling for race in these logits masks some
of the welfare participation differences between a typical immigrant and a
typical native.
The coefficients reported in Table 5 also document a strong
assimilation effect on the use of welfare by immigrant households: the
longer an immigrant household resides in the United States, the greater its
chances of being on welfare, both in absolute terms and relative to native
households. The estimated coefficients of the age and age squared variables
indicate that welfare recipiency increases with the age of the household13
head for both native and immigrant households, but the coefficients on the
years since migration variables imply that immigrant welfare participation
grows more rapidly with age than does native welfare participation. This
assimilation effect is both numerically and statistically significant, and
it becomes stronger in column 2 where detailed demographic controls are
included.
Figure 1 illustrates the substantive importance of the assimilation
effect. Using the estimates from column 1 of Table 5, we trace out lifetime
welfare participation for all immigrant c,ohorts (as well as natives),
assuming that immigrant households arrive in this country when the head is
20 years old.15 In Figure 1, we graph the predicted differences in welfare
participation rates between immigrants and natives over the life cycle, so
that the horizontal line at zero represents native households. Because
these are relative participation rates, they net out the effect of age on
welfare participation that is common to both immigrants and natives.
Therefore, the upward slope of the immigrant curves reflects the additional
effect of aging on immigrant welfare participation due to assimilation.
Perhaps the most striking result in Figure 1 is the implication that
all post-1950 immigrant cohorts will eventually have larger welfare
propensities than native households. The graph also indicates that, towards
the end of the life cycle, there is a very large differential in welfare
participation rates between immigrants and native households for most
immigrant cohorts. For instance, all the post-1960 immigrant cohorts have
welfare participation rates that exceed those of natives by at least 3
percentage points after age 50.




























immigrant welfare participation? In the next section we demonstrate that
the cohort effects are closely related to secular changes in the national
origin mix of the immigrant flow. Before turning to this analysis, however,
we first examine possible factors that could cause immigrant welfare
participation to increase with duration of residence in the United States.
It is somewhat surprising that the process of assimilation leads
immigrants into welfare rather than out of it, especially because
assimilation tends to increase immigrant earnings. The increase in welfare
participation as an immigrant cohort ages may be due to legal requirements,
such as permanent legal residence or citizenship, which restrict the
participation of recent immigrants in some welfare programs. Immigrants may
also believe that their chances for naturalization (and hence for sponsoring
the entry of relatives through the family preference system) are jeopardized
if they receive welfare. Moreover, immigrants who become public charges in
the first five years after arrival are liable for deportation, although this
provision of the law is seldom enforced (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, 1989, p. 119). Finally, it is also possible that immigrant
assimilation involves the accumulation of information not only about labor
market opportunities, but also about alternative opportunities available
through the welfare system.
To the extent that institutional factors restrict immigrant welfare
participation, most of the increase in welfare recipiency over time should
occur as the immigrant passes through certain legal thresholds, such as the
five-year residence period required for naturalization. To test this
implication, Table 6 presents pooled welfare participation logits identical
to those in Table 5 except that years since migration is entered as a set ofTABLE 6
Threshold Effects on Immigrant Assimilation
into the Welfare System
(1) (2)
Variable Coefficient dP/dX Coefficient dP/dX
5-10 Years Since Migration .2929*** .0235 .1282 .0103
(3.61) (1.50)
11-20 Years Since Migration .2826*** .0227 .3887*** .0312
(4.75) (6.18)




-2Log Likelihood 125293.2 110833.9
Sample Size 250,527 250,527
Note: The t-statistics are presented in parentheses. The marginal impactsdP/dX
are evaluated at the mean 1980 welfare participation probability in the immigrant
sample, which is .088. The additional standardizing variables used in column 2 are:
education, marital status, and health of the household head; the number of children
in the household aged 0-5, 6-11, and 12-17; the number of persons aged 65 orover;
the number of disabled persons; household size; and whether the household resides in
a metropolitan area.
*Statisticallysignificant at the .10 level; **atthe .05 level; ***atthe .01
level (two-tailed tests)15
dummy variables rather than as a quadratic. The coefficient on the dummy
variable representing a given duration of residence interval measures
welfare participation for these immigrants relative to immigrants with five
or fewer years in the United States. Only these coefficients are reported,
as the other coefficients remain substantially unchanged.
Table 6 suggests that the timing of the assimilation process depends on
whether we control for detailed demographic characteristics. The column 1
estimates, which do not standardize for these variables, indicate that
welfare participation rates jump by about, two percentage points as
immigrants go from five or fewer years of residence to 6-10 years, and
welfare participation remains remarkably constant thereafter. This supports
the notion that observed immigrant welfare assimilation is primarily due to
legal restrictions associated with naturalization and the threat of
deportation. However, the column 2 estimates, which include demographic
control variables, lead to the opposite conclusion. Here welfare recipiency
increases smoothly throughout the immigrant's lifetime.
To investigate this issue further, we estimated welfare participation
logits separately for immigrants from each of the various cohorts, and
included a variable indicating whether an immigrant had become naturalized.
If legal restrictions are an important obstacle to immigrant welfare
participation, then recipiency should be greater among those immigrants who
have already obtained citizenship. We could detect no systematic
relationship between welfare recipiency and citizenship status, and
therefore tentatively conclude that, although legal restrictions associated
with citizenship may account for some of observed immigrant welfare
assimilation, these institutional factors do not provide a complete16
explanation.
Cohort Effects and National Origin
Because of changes in U.S. immigration policy and in political and
economic conditions in the source countries, the postwar period has
witnessed a remarkable shift in the national origin mix of the immigrant
population. The magnitude of this shift is briefly summarized in Table 7,
which presents the national origin mix of immigrants admitted in each decade
between 1930 and 1980. During the Great Depression, a period in which the
size of the immigrant flow was at a record low, nearly two thirds of the
immigrants originated in Europe, and the remainder originated in the Western
Hemisphere. By the l950s, the fraction of persons originating in Europe had
declined to about 40 percent, the fraction originating in the Americas
increased to 40 percent, and the size of the Asian immigrant flow became
non-trivial (6 percent of the immigrants). During the 1970s, the share of
Europeans declined further to 18 percent, the share of Western Hemisphere
immigrants was 44 percent, and Asian countries were responsible for about a
third of the immigrant flow.
Earlier in this paper, we documented the huge dispersion that exists in
welfare participation rates among national origin groups. The varying
welfare dependency of national origin groups suggests that shifts in the
source country composition of the immigrant flow may be responsible for the
sizable cohort effects that have led to a secular increase in immigrant
welfare participation.
We use the welfare participation behavior documented in the 1980 CensusTABLE 7
Origin of Legal Immigration Flows, 1931-1980
Percent of Immigrant Flow Originating in:
Western
Period: Africa Asia Hemisphere Europe
1931-1940 .3 3.0 30.3 65.8
1941-1950 .7 3.1 34.3 60.0
1951-1960 .6 6.1 39.6 52.7
1961-1970 .9 12.9 51.6 33.8
1971-1980 1.8 35.3 44.1 17.8
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (various years). The rows do not add to
100 percent because some immigrants originated in Oceania, and because the
national origin of a small number of immigrants is unknown.17
data to assess the importance of national origin in explaining these trends.
16 Consider the following linear probability model:
(2) D.. —X..+E w.N. +
13 13 i3ii ii
where D. is a dummy variable indicating if household i from national origin
group j receives welfare, the vector X contains standardizing variables, and
the vector of dummy variables N indicates the country of origin of the
household. For a native household, all te variables in the vector N are
set equal to zero. Using the estimated coefficients of the dummy variables
for the various national origin groups, it is then possible to predict the
average welfare participation rate of immigrants (relative to natives) by
weighting the coefficients by a particular national origin mix. Let q be
the fraction of the immigrant population (or flow) in time t which
originated in country j. For a given vector w of estimated national origin
differentials, the predicted welfare participation rate of the immigrant
population (relative to natives) is given by:
(3)
Table 8 summarizes the results of these calculations. We first
estimate equation (2) without any standardizing variables, so that the
coefficients of the dummy variables simply indicate the average welfare
participation rate of each of the immigrant groups (relative to natives).
Column 1 reports I calculated using this particular set of coefficients.
If the national origin mix of the immigrant flow was given bythatoftheTABLE 8
Predicted Welfare Participation Rates of Immigrants
(Relative to Natives) Under Alternative National Origin Distributions
National Orizin Mix (1) (2) (3) (4)
Stock of Foreign-Born
in 1970 Census -.0020 -.0171 -.0137 -.0169
Stock of Foreign-Born
in 1980 Census .0088 .0022 .0045 -.0056
1950-1959 Flow -.0009 -.0132 -.0102 -.0156
1960-1964 Flow .0182 .0142 .0155 .0057
1965-1969 Flow .0140 .0123 .0133 .0045
1970-1974 Flow .0208 .0258 .0263 .0057
1975-1980 Flow .0219 .0263 .0273 .0109
Holds Constant Age, Sex No Yes Yes Yes
Holds Constant Year of
Immigration No No Yes Yes
Holds Constant Other
Demographic
Characteristics No No No Yes
Note: The additional standardizing variables used in column 4 are: education,
marital status, and health of household head; the number of children in the
household aged 0-5, 6-11, and 12-17; the number of persons aged 65 or over; the
number of disabled persons; household size; and whether the household resides
in a metropolitan area.18
stock of foreign-born persons residing in the United States in 1970, the
immigrant welfare participation rate would be about -. 2percentage points
below that of natives. However, if the national origin mix was given by
that of the stock of foreign-born persons residing in the United States in
1980, immigrants would have a welfare welfare participation rate that is .9
percentage points above that of natives. In other words, the changing
national origin mix between 1970 and 1980 would alone account for about a
one percentage point increase in the welfare participation rate of
immigrants. As revealed by the summary statistics in Table 1, this is
roughly the size of the increase that actually occurred in the welfare
participation rate of immigrants (relative to natives) during this period.
Even more dramatic increases in welfare participation rates due to
shifts in the national origin mix of the immigrant flow are suggested by the
remaining rows of Table 8, where the weights are the national origin mix of
specific waves of immigrants (as opposed to the stock of foreign-born
persons residing in the U.S. in any given Census year). For instance, an
immigrant flow with the national origin mix of the 1950-1959 cohort leads to
a welfare participation rate that is -.1percent below that of natives. The
national origin mix of the 1965-1969 cohort leads to a welfare participation
rate that is 1.4 percentage points above that of natives, and the national
origin mix of the 1975-1980 cohort leads to a welfare participation rate
that is 2.2 percentage points above that of natives.
The remaining columns of Table 8 use alternative specifications of the
control vector X in equation (2) to document changes in immigrant welfare
participation behavior due to secular shifts in national origin. The
simulations reveal that changes in the national origin mix of the immigrant19
stock between 1970 and 1980 are responsible for an increase in the immigrant
welfare participation rate of over 1 percentage point, regardless of the set
of standardizing variables used. Our analysis, therefore, indicates that
secular changes in the country of origin of U.S. immigrants go a long way
toward explaining the increase in welfare recipiency among immigrant
households observed in the postwar period.
The Costs of Immigrant Participation in the Welfare System
Using the life cycle profiles of welfare participation behavior
illustrated in Figure 1, it is possible to estimate the dollar costs of
welfare participation by a typical immigrant household in each of the
cohorts. The estimates from the first column of Table 5 allow us to predict
the probability that a given household will receive welfare at any point in
the life cycle. To keep the calculations simple, we assume that, once on
welfare, an immigrant household receives the average $2727 (in 1979dollars)
of welfare income actually reported by such households in the 1980 Census.
It is then relatively straightforward to calculate the expected present
value of welfare costs for a given household in each immigrant cohort. We
use a 5 percent rate of discount and assume that the household head resides
in the United States from age 20 to 70.17
Table 9 summarizes the results of these calculations. Over its
lifetime, the typical immigrant household which arrived between 1975 and
1980 will receive $7925 in welfare payments. Not only is this 71percent
higher than the lifetime welfare payment received by native households, it
is also substantially higher than that received by previous immigrantTABLE 9
Expected Welfare Costs Over the Life Cycle for
a Typical Household









cohorts. For instance, it is 26 percent higher than the welfare income
received by the 1960-1964 cohort, and 89 percent higher than that received
by the 1950-1959 cohort.
To demonstrate the fiscal effects of the secular increase in welfare
participation across immigrant cohorts, it is useful to calculate the
aggregate costs associated with a particular cohort's welfare participation.
For example, the 1980 Census enumerated 824,240 immigrant households that
arrived in the United States between 1975 and 1980. gecause, on average,
each household receives a lifetime we1fat income of $7925, the total
welfare costs associated with this cohort are approximately $6.5 billion. A
similarly-sized group of native households, however, would receive aggregate
welfare payments of only $3.8 billion, while a similarly-sized group of
immigrant households who arrived between 1950 and 1959 would have a welfare
bill of only $3.5 billion. These calculations, therefore, suggest that
there are substantial fiscal costs associated with the changing skills of
the immigrant flow. The different welfare participation behavior of the
1950-1959 and the 1975-1980 immigrant cohorts is alone responsible for an
increase of about $3 billion in welfare costs.
Summary and Conclusion
This paper has presented a systematic empirical analysis of immigrant
participation In the welfare system using the 1970 and 1980 Public Use
Samples of the U.S. Census. In contrast to previous studies, we have
focused on differences in welfare participation behavior across immigrant
cohorts and countries of origin and over time as a single cohort21
assimilates.
The main findings of the study are:
1. Recent immigrant cohorts are much more likely to enter the welfare
system than earlier cohorts. This finding mirrors the result in the
existing literature that more recent immigrant waves are less skilled than
previous waves.
2. The longer an immigrant household has resided in the United States,
the more likely it is to receive welfare. This aging effect is sufficiently
strong so that after a decade or two in this country every immigrant cohort
admitted in the postwar period has a higher rate of welfare recipiency than
natives. The assimilation process, therefore, not only raises immigrant
earnings in the labor market, but also leads to increased immigrant
utilization of the alternative income opportunities available through the
welfare system.
3.There is considerable dispersion in welfare participation rates
across national origin groups. Among female-headed households, for example,
immigrants originating in some countries have welfare participation rates
exceeding 30 percent, while immigrants originating in other countries have
welfare participation rates below 10 percent. Our analysis indicates that
the historic shift in the national origin mix of the immigrant flow
witnessed in the postwar period- -with fewer immigrants originating in Europe
and more now coming from Asia and Latin America- -ismainly responsible for
the secular rise in immigrant welfare participation.
4. The relatively high propensities of recent immigrant cohorts to
enter the welfare system are associated with significant increases in the
costs of income transfer programs. For instance, if the welfare22
participation behavior of the 1975-1980 immigrant cohort were the same as
that of the 1950-1959 cohort, the present value of welfare costs would be
reduced by $3 billion.
Some observers (Simon 1989) have recently argued that immigration to
the United States confers a net economic gain upon natives. However,
mounting empirical research reveals that more recent immigrant cohorts are
less skilled and less successful in the labor market than earlier cohorts
(Borjas 1990). This means that many of the benefits provided by immigrant
workers, such as tax revenues and humancapitalexternalities, have been
shrinking over time. Our research indicates that the welfare costs of
immigration have been growing over time. Taken together, these trends are
not necessarily inconsistent with the conjecture that immigrants are a net
gain, but they do imply that the size of the gain has become smaller in
recent years. Although the goal of immigration policy need not be to
maximize economic gains to natives, the empirical evidence presented in this
paper suggests that sizable costs are associated with policies that ignore
the economic consequences of immigration.23
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1. Surveys of this literature are available in Greenwood and McDowell
(1986) and Borjas (1990).
2.See Grossman (1982), Borjas (1986), Card (1990), Altonji and Card
(1990), and LaLonde and Topel (1990) for estimates of the labor market
effects of immigrants upon natives.
3. Simon (1989, Appendix B) discusses the results of public opinion
surveys about immigrants and immigration.
4. The GNP statistics are obtained from U.S. Bureau of the Census
(1985, p. 842), and the mean welfare income of immigrant households is
calculated from the 1980 Census data described below.
5.Blau's work also analyzes immigrant participation in social
insurance programs (such as Social Security), but we focus exclusively on
public assistance programs. Simon (1984) examines the related question of
whether the immigrant contribution to tax revenues exceeds the costs
associated with their participation in the income transfer system. Simon
concludes that immigration yields a net gain to the U.S. Treasury.
6. A recent discussion of this methodological problem is given by27
Hecknian and Robb (1983).
7. Recently, Jensen (1988) combined data from the 1970 and 1980 U.s.
Censusesin an attempt to examine how immigrant welfare participation
changed over the decade. However, because he failed to disentangle cohort
and assimilation effects, his study is subject to the same shortcomings as
the papers that relied on a single cross-section.
8.Because of the large number of natives in the raw data, we use a
1/1000 native sample for each of the Censuses.
9.Because the Census definition o a household includes all those
residing in the same housing unit, Census households may be comprised of
individuals from different families. The empirical analysis reported in
this paper uses the Census definition of a household, but the analysis was
also replicated excluding from the sample all individuals not related to the
household head, and the results did not change.
10. Of course, the comparisons presented in Table 2 are affected by
sample attrition due to death or emigration.
11. It is worth noting that the dispersion in welfare recipiency rates
among national origin groups remains even after standardizing for a large
set of demographic characteristics, including household size and years of
residence in the United States. This fact is implicit in the results
discussed below.
12. Because of the large sample sizes, we use random subsamples to
estimate the maximum likelihood logits reported in this section and the
next. The sampling fractions are: 50 percent of the data for natives; 100
percent of immigrants in the 1970 file; and 33 percent of immigrants in the
1980 file.28
13. In the absence of this assumption, the variables indicating the
year of immigration, the number of years of residence in the United States,
and the dununy variable for the Census year would be perfectly collinear.
14. One variable not controlled for in these estimates is the
generosity of the welfare system in the household's state of residence.
Because benefit levels vary widely across states, and because immigrants are
more geographically concentrated than natives (Bartel 1989), this might
affect the results, especially if geographic concentration differs across
immigrant cohorts. Unfortunately, we caiot correctly address this issue in
the current paper, because in order to obtain an adequate number of
observations for each immigrant cohort and country of origin we ended up
using data from the 1970 Census that does not always identify state of
residence. However, adding a vector of state dummy variables does not
greatly affect the 1980 cross-section estimates reported in Table 4, so
controlling for state effects probably would not change the pooled estimates
in Table 5. Moreover, estimates which do not control for state of residence
may be more relevant for policy calculations of how immigrant cohorts differ
in terms of welfare costs.
15. The intercepts in Figure 1 represent cohort effects upon arrival
in the U.S. (at age 20). They differ slightly from those reported in Table
5, however, both because of the non-linearity of the logit transformation
and because dp/dX in Table 5 is estimated at the mean welfare participation
rate of immigrants.
16. The regression includes a vector of 66 country dummies (for the
countries with the largest immigrant flows in the postwar period) ,aswell
as an additional dummy representing all other source countries, It was29
estimatedby least squares because the very large sample size and the large
number of regressors made maximum likelihood estimation impractical.
17.Ofcourse, a more general analysis should provide a joint study of
the welfare participation decision and of the level of welfare incomes to
which immigrant households are entitled. Because we ignore the latter, the
results reported in this section are best viewed as preliminary calculations
of the welfare costs associated with immigration.